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Set foot in a French anarchist bookstore—say, the Librairie Publico on
the Rue Amelot in Paris—and you will find, in addition to shelves full
of  books and journals originating in France, written to a Francophone
audience, shelves full of  works in English and translations from English.
It would be difficult to find the like in any American anarchist bookstore.
This is perhaps true of  of  many other languages and of  many other
kinds of  publishing in many other country. English is, after all, the
imperial language du siècle. Nonetheless, the results are lamentable: while
French, following our current controversies and reading our classics,
enjoy full access to the spectrum of  Anglo-American anarchist
theoretical discourse, we cannot say the same of  theirs. Part of  what
we Anglophone readers are missing, wrapped in our protective
linguistico-imperial cocoon, is aptly represented by a growing body of
work by Daniel Colson, a sociologist at the Université de Saint-Étienne
in Lyon. We have had a first glimpse of  it in the form of  a single essay,
“Nietzsche and the Libertarian Movement,” included in the 2004
anthology, I am Not a Man, I Am Dynamite!: Nietzsche and Anarchism,1 but
Colson’s primary contributions—his two books, the Petit lexique
philosophique de l’anarchisme de Proudhon à Deleuze (2001)2 and Trois essais de
philosophie anarchiste: Islam, histoire, monadologie (2004)3—remain unavailable
in English. This is much to the detriment of  English-speaking scholars
still seeking to validate anarchism not only as an object of  study—an
historical curiosity, say, or an exhibit in the museum of  political
ideologies—but as a subject position from which to study everything
else, a project of  inquiry.
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However, Colson does not make a traditional defense of  the
anarchist tradition, a variant of  which appears in the recent work of
David Graeber, for instance (in Fragments of  an Anarchist Anthropology
and Possibilities: Essays on Hierarchy, Rebellion, and Desire).4 Conceding the
deficit of  theoretical glamor in the anarchist tradition—e.g., “there’s
no anarchist theory of  the commodity form”—Graeber spins a vacuum
into a virtue: if  “anarchism does not tend to have much use for high
theory,” this is because “anarchism is mainly about the ethics of
practice.”5 While there is some truth to this apologia (Marx’s chef  d’oeuvre,
after all, was Das Kapital, while Proudhon’s was De la Justice), it dovetails
too neatly with the reigning assumption in nearly all scholarly studies
of  anarchism—namely, that anarchism is not a coherent body of
thought, but something essentially “irrational,” like a belief  system
(perhaps an offshoot of  Gnostic mysticism or millenialism) or an instinct
(a rebellious “impulse”).6 Colson, on the contrary, proposes to take
anarchists seriously as thinkers, as the creators not only of  sophisticated
collective practices (e.g., the affinity group, the spokes-council, the
decentralized federation) but also of  conceptions of  the world or
ontologies.
In this respect, Colson’s contribution is truly distinctive—and
in ways that might at first fail to meet the eye. Indeed, at first glance, a
British or American reader might imagine this work to be nothing
new: Colson’s books can be placed among a body of  work in English
under the general heading of  “anarchism and poststructuralism” or
(somewhat misleadingly) “postanarchism,” joining books such as Todd
May’s Political Philosophy of  Poststructuralist Anarchism (1994)7 and Saul
Newman’s From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-authoritarianism and the Dislocation
of  Power (2001).8 In fact, like both of  these authors, Colson takes a great
deal of  inspiration from Deleuze, one of  the two pole stars listed in
the title of  his Petit lexique. However, the interpretation Colson gives to
Deleuze, to post-structuralism, and to anarchism is unique, and he
takes these in surprising directions. The chief  surprise is in the deftness
with which Colson avoids what has heretofore been one of  the major
problems besetting attempts to link post-structuralism with anarchism.
While they clearly admire and value the precedent set by anarchists,
May and Newman both treat it as yet another defective discourse,
founded on an essentialist “belief ” in the goodness of  human nature.
Once this discourse is put through the wringer of  anti-essentialism,
not much is left: at best, the anarchist tradition is retained in an
attenuated, abstract form—a “critique of  representation” which is
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perhaps better left to academic philosophers such as Jean-François
Lyotard or W. V. O. Quine. Thus, in their eagerness to get (to paraphrase
Newman’s title) from anarchism to post-structuralism, May and Newman
both seem compelled to leave the entire history of  anarchism behind,
to shed its defining texts and experiences as a kind of  dead weight:
serious discussion of  Bakunin ends a third of  the way into Newman’s
book, and May simply stops talking about Bakunin midway through,
as if  he (and all the other voices of  anarchism, from the Magón brothers
to the Mujeres Libres) has nothing more to say to us. Colson makes this
past speak again.
What this past speaks of, for Colson, is a heretical ontological
tradition—“a thought too sulfurous to take its place in the official
edifice of  philosophy”—which seeks to escape the categories into which
philosophical thought has been corralled: humanist/anti-humanist,
essentialist/constructivist, foundationalist/anti-foundationalist, etc.
These were the antinomies that emerged so starkly during the famous
1971 debate between Chomsky and Foucault—an encounter in which
two of  the world’s preeminent anti-authoritarian thinkers failed to
understand one another.9 For Chomsky, Foucault’s radical social
constructivism seemed to offer no ethical foundation for resistance to
oppressive power—if  we are just what power makes us, how can we
ever rebel against it?—while Foucault saw Chomsky’s Enlightenment-
derived essentialist conception of  “human nature” as itself  a kind of
ideological screen, obscuring from view the historical forces and power
relations that produce our ideas of  what is just, right, and “natural.”
Proudhon and Spinoza, on Colson’s account, help us to think our way
out of  this antinomy by radically reconceiving the relationship between
freedom and power. They do so in a way, moreover, which at once
affirms something of  Foucault’s anti-foundationalism and
constructivism—“that which seems to be in the principle, at the
beginning, only comes afterwards, is only an effect of  composition”—
while at the same time reaffirming Chomsky’s concern for the “radical
autonomy” of  the human subject from the historically local and
politically partisan “forces that make it possible.” In defiance equally
of  essentialist and antiessentialist dogmas, in short, Proudhon and
Spinoza render an ontology of  freedom.
In the best tradition of  French philosophy, Colson establishes
connections and syntheses that are at once intuitive and counterintuitive.
It is scarcely surprising, for example, that Colson would discuss Negri
and Deleuze, two thinkers who, more so than any others, have influenced
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the nature and scope of  contemporary debate about Spinoza’s
metaphysics and politics. At the same time, however, Colson explores
a relatively neglected and frequently overlooked intellectual tradition—
the tradition of  anarchism—to motivate his critique of  Negri and his
comparatively favorable analysis of  Deleuze. It is precisely this dexterity
and ingenuity that makes Colson such an interesting thinker, not just
to anarchists but to scholars of  European philosophy more generally.
Perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from this essay,
however, is that the thought of  anarchist philosophers like Proudhon
and Bakunin is very much alive. Like Deleuze, Negri, and Balibar, Colson
strives to read against the grain—to seek out and unearth new
possibilities and revolutionary potentialities within “established”
philosophical concepts. But what he discovers in so doing is that he
and his peers are unwittingly participating in a much older European
tradition. After all, Proudhon and Bakunin and countless other lesser
known anarchists were reading against the grain long ago. To understand
this is not just to understand our anarchist forebears, but to understand
something about ourselves.
Certainly, Colson m akes us listen again to the voice of  Deleuze,
attending to what we have so far failed to hear, or heard very mutedly,
as when he remarks during a 1980 seminar on Spinoza: “It is
antihierarchical thought. It is almost a kind of  anarchy.”10
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